Walras’ Law, General Gluts and Zero-Sum Economics

August 29, 2014 5 comments

There is a thread in the blogosphere that seems to have started years ago but which popped back up recently about general gluts and Walras’ law which I have been pondering for a while and have a lot of comments on.  I will take them one at a time.  This will be kind of a deep dive.  Here are the relevant posts going back to 2011.

DeLong [2011]

Dan Kuehn [2011]

DeLong [2014]

Rowe [2014]

[Update: missed the most important one] Rowe

1. Walras’ Law and general gluts

First of all, I think that Nick Rowe, who is becoming my favorite econ blogger, is being a bit too reactionary about Walras’ Law when he says this:

Walras’ Law is the biggest fallacy we are still teaching in economics.

But before I get to why that is, let me agree with what I think are most of his general points.  At the heart of the matter is the question of whether there is such a thing as a general glut.  Some people cite Walras’ Law to argue that such a thing is not possible but this is an abuse of the law.  It reminds me of another similar law (theorem) which is particularly near and dear to my heart: the Coase Theorem .

The Coase Theorem says essentially that if there are no transaction costs, any particular assignment of property rights will result in an efficient outcome.  There are two ways that people commonly abuse this theorem.  One is to say “the Coase theorem proves that property rights don’t matter.”  Another is to say “well we observe inefficient outcomes so clearly the theorem is wrong.”  Both of these entirely miss the point of the theorem.  It is not meant to assert that everything is efficient all the time and property rights don’t matter.  It is to focus our attention on the necessary cause of market inefficiency, namely transaction costs.  If transaction costs are present, you might expect the assignment of property rights to matter.  Similarly, if you have what seems to be a market failure, you aught to be looking for some type of transaction cost (which could be a lot of things) as the culprit.  (Also note, for the record, that there is a big difference between getting an efficient outcome with any distribution of property rights and property rights not mattering.)

The same thing is true of Walras’ Law.  (Though I must say I have never read Walras, so I can’t speak to what he was actually trying to argue but this, I believe, is the proper context in which to view the law.)   Walras’ Law is “true” in the context of the model in which it is derived, the general equilibrium model of an endowment economy with a Walrasian auctioneer, a point which, for the record, Nick acknowledges.  This does not mean that the conclusion reached in the context of that model must be true in the real world, but that doesn’t mean that it is a useless thing to teach.

If your physics teacher told you that the Law of Gravity proves that a bird can’t fly in a vacuum, and you came to the conclusion that therefore, birds can’t fly, you would be mistaken.  However, if you came to the conclusion that, because the Law of Gravity implies that birds can’t fly in a vacuum and birds can, in fact, fly, that the law of Gravity is wrong/useless, you would also be mistaken.  It just so happens that birds don’t exist in a vacuum.  What you should do is notice that air must play some critical role in the process of flight.  This is an important insight into the process which is easier to notice once you have ruled out the possibility of flight in its absence.

Now the “air” in the Walrasian model is money.  In that model, money acts as a “veil over barter.”  If you had a frictionless barter economy, the Law would apply.  And for that matter, if you have an economy where money serves only to replicate a frictionless barter economy, it will apply.  With this in mind, if you think you might be observing a “general glut,” there are two ways of interpreting it.  One is to say that such a thing is not possible so we must actually be observing something else.  This, I think, is the basic idea that Nick is arguing with and he is right to do so.  The other, I think more correct approach, is to say that we don’t appear to live in a frictionless barter economy (or something analogous).  Specifically, I would argue that the role of money is much more important in ways that are not captured by that model.  And this is exactly what Nick is arguing.  So I whole-heartedly agree on that point.  However, I think that rather than proclaiming Walras’ Law “wrong” and saying we shouldn’t teach it, he should be using it to make his point by saying “look, we have this law which says that if money performs its task of making the economy work like a frictionless, barter economy, we wouldn’t have general gluts and yet we have them.  So this should tell us that the root cause of them must be somehow contained in the functioning of the monetary system.”

2. More on the Walrasian model (skippable)

This is kind of in the weeds and a bit beside my main point but I can’t resist going a little deeper.  Take Nick’s example.

An excess demand for bonds cannot cause demand-deficient unemployment. Remember my three women? The hairdresser, manicurist, and masseuse? Suppose they all have an excess demand for bonds. They want to sell their services for bonds. But they can’t, because none of them wants to sell bonds. So do they suffer deficient-demand unemployment? Not if they can barter their way back to full-employment. And Walras’ Law is supposed to be true in all economies, whether barter or monetary.

To me this is playing fast and loose with the model.  Of course, there is a lot of that going on on all sides here, so this is also a criticism of the excess-demand-for-bonds-causes-a-general-glut theory.  In the model, you can’t have an excess demand for money because there is no demand for money because money is acting only as a veil over barter.  People only actually want goods.  Now if you put bonds in as a good, then people are actually willing to trade hair dressing and massages for bonds.  This means that if the Walrasian auctioneer calls out a certain vector of prices for these goods and there is an excess demand for bonds there will be an excess supply of other goods.

However, I don’t think this model was ever intended to be a model of disequilibrium.  Walras’ Law is meant to show that such a frictionless economy will tend toward a general equilibrium.  It is analogous to saying, in an individual market, that supply is upward sloping and demand is downward sloping.  Saying that doesn’t mean that the model is always in equilibrium.  But it does imply that if people are allowed to bid prices up and down, and there are no other funky constraints, that it aught to tend toward an equilibrium and that equilibrium aught to be stable.  If you had both upward sloping or downward sloping or if the process of bidding prices up/down worked differently than hypothesized, prices and/or quantities might shoot off to zero of infinity or something.

By the way, notice that when people say things like “the Walrasian model does not specify any kind of mechanism for determining prices” they are not really being straight.  The mechanism is the process of bidding prices up when there is a shortage and down where there is a surplus.  This is explained in any intro class but then promptly forgotten by professors who like to pooh-pooh classical economics.  The Walrasian  auctioneer is essentially used to represent this mechanism in a simpler way.  Walras’ Law is analogous to this in a general-equilibrium sense in that it tells you that if one market is out of equilibrium for a given vector of prices, then some other market must also be out of equilibrium in such a way that the hypothesized process of bidding prices toward equilibrium in both markets moves you toward a general equilibrium rather than spiraling off into some kind of black hole.

Now, just like you can add in a constraint in the market for a single good, like a price ceiling and find that the market wont then arrive at the Walrasian equilibrium but rather at some other equilibrium, you could do this in the general equilibrium model.  If you said the price of bonds is X but include a constraint limiting the quantity demanded to some amount less than would be demanded at that price, and let every other market clear, you will arrive at some kind of second-best equilibrium in which the prices of every other good clear the markets for those goods given the constraint on bonds.  But in some sense, there will still be an excess supply of those goods relative to bonds given the price X.  People would be willing to trade hair dressing and/or massages for bonds at that price if they could.  What Nick seems to be saying is that this doesn’t matter because they don’t care about bonds, they only care about real goods and the real goods markets are all in equilibrium.  But this is treating bonds like a real good in one sense and then later treating them as if they don’t matter and are just part of the veil.  If nobody cares how many bonds they have, then there isn’t really an excess demand.

The same thing applies to unobtainium.  If you make a model with a price for unobtainium and a constraint setting the quantity equal to zero and let the rest of the markets find a market-clearing equilibrium, you can say that there is excess supply of other goods relative to unobtainium at those prices but that the rest of the market is in a second-best equilibrium given the constraint.  This does not mean that this “excess demand” for unobtainium or bonds causes a general glut or unemployment of course (technically Nick’s point in this context), but I also don’t think it makes Walras’ Law wrong, it’s just playing with definitions in an esoteric and not very helpful way.  So I feel like Nick is  shadow-boxing with an erroneous expression of Walras’ Law crudely repurposed as a theory of recessions (or I guess a couple different theories….or is one an anti-theory?)

I can see why a macro guy would be annoyed by these but I think we should avoid throwing it out all together.  At most, we should let the micro folks keep it but make them promise not to bring it up in discussions of the business cycle at faculty cocktail parties.

3.  Shortage of bonds

Having said the above, I think the whole shortage-of-bonds thing is a silly basis for a theory of recessions because I don’t think I have ever seen a shortage of bonds.  There is a big difference between high demand and excess demand.  If you can go buy a bond at the market price, it’s not excess demand.  A shortage of money is a different story (again, as Nick notes).

4. Zero-sum economics

Dan Kuehn:

You will occasionally hear people say that general gluts can’t happen. That’s zero-sum economics, and it’s been proven wrong empirically and theoretically time and time again. We need more Smithian and Keynesian economics, but I don’t think that means we need less Hayek or Lucas. It simply means that this paradigm shift needs to be more completely integrated and we’ve got to stop this balkanization of the discipline that is always looking for grand ideological fights.

I just want to point out that, even though I am not saying there cannot be a general glut, such a statement does not amount to zer0-sum economics.  I want to do this because I think the single most important thing that we can learn from economics, and probably the thing most commonly forgotten, is that trade is not a zero-sum game.  But there are two ways in which this is the case.  One way is that we can actually get more stuff.  This is what Adam Smith had in mind when he talked about specialization of labor being limited by the extent of the market.  The other is that people have different subjective values of goods.  This means that even if the quantities of goods are fixed, trade can be mutually beneficial.  It’s important not to forget the second one.

Because of this second consideration, saying that a general glut can’t happen is not adopting a sort of zero-sum economics.  It is possible to have a fixed level of output without having an efficient allocation.  It is similarly possible to be on the production possibility frontier without being at the efficient point.  Because of this, there is a place for models of trade that work from a fixed quantity of goods.  And by the way, if you have a PPF that is shifting around endogenously based on the decisions you are trying to model, you haven’t specified it correctly.  [There Is some room for it to evolve endogenously over time but I don't think that is what we're talking about here.]

5.  Money: two goods, one price

It’s a notion which is almost as dirty as it sounds.  Here’s Dan Kuehn.

Money is really two products trading at the same price: it’s a medium of exchange and it’s a source of liquidity.

Now here is the most important point relative to the core agenda of this blog.  Money is, in a sense, two things but they are not the two things that DK claims and they do each have their own price (though they are related).  This highlights perfectly the central misconception that nearly everyone seems to be under regarding the nature of money.  Medium of exchange and source of liquidity are not different things.  They are the same thing.  To say that money is “liquid” is only to say that it is a convenient medium of exchange.  Anything can be used as a medium of exchange.  Some things are more convenient than others.  “Liquid” is just a word we use to say that something is particularly convenient for that purpose.

But deep down we know that it makes no sense for something which would be otherwise worthless to be used as a medium of exchange.  We know it has to have two uses.  This becomes paradoxical in the presence of the prevailing theory of fiat money which tells us that money has no other purpose, so we end up saying things that don’t make sense like medium of exchange and source of liquidity are two different things.  To try and sort this out, let’s go back to commodity money where the actual  two things can be easily seen.

If you had a pure barter economy, gold would be valuable.  It has use in various applications, most notably making things look more interesting or impressive than they would otherwise look, which is one of man kind’s greatest aspirations.  In other words, it’s a “real” good.  Of course, barter is complicated and gold is a particularly convenient good to use for trading because it is durable, easily identifiable, divisible, etc. so it makes sense for it to become a common medium of exchange.  This means that it would be highly liquid.

Now, in this case, gold is serving two purposes.  It can be used to make things look cool (and whatever else it can be used for) and it can also be used as a medium of exchange.  If it had no added value as a medium of exchange, it would still be valuable.  It would have some price relative to other goods and that price would change at some rate.  That rate of change in its price would be such that the value of it in terms of other goods would increase as the value of other investments excepting unexpected shocks to the long-run supply and demand.  That rate would be the interest rate (see the Hotelling Rule).

Already, there are two prices of gold, the spot price and the rate of interest (the spot price would really be many prices because there are many other goods but let’s just call it one price).  But of course, the interest rate would not be specific to gold, it would be the same for all assets so it wouldn’t really be the price of holding gold, it would be the price of holding wealth in whatever form and the spot prices of all of those various forms would distinguish their respective values in use.

Now, if we let gold be the common medium of exchange and therefore the most liquid good available to hold as wealth, people will prefer holding it to holding other goods at the same rate of return.  This means that the rate of return on holding it will fall below that of other goods.  And this means that there will be two rates of return.  Let the rate on all other assets (investments), measured in other assets be r and the rate on gold, measured in other assets be d (for “deflation”).  Since this return has to come from the price changing and there is now a differential between the rate at which prices are changing and the real rate of return on other investments, this differential must manifest itself in the form of a third rate which we know as the nominal rate or i.  This nominal rate is the price of liquidity.  (And naturally, the spot price will be higher than it would otherwise be because the price has to fall more slowly, or alternately because the added benefit from liquidity will cause it to be used up at a slower rate.)

So now you have a good with two purposes and two prices.  There is a price paid for the liquidity which is also the price paid for services as a medium of exchange.  This is the nominal rate.  There is also a spot price, let’s call it the price level, which includes both the value of the eventual use and the value of holding for liquidity purposes.  The system is not over-identified.  You just have to look at it as a dynamic system.  Oh, and you have to notice the two reasons that money (gold) is valuable.

Now, if you have gold notes, which are redeemable in gold, you have the same thing.  The notes are valuable because gold is valuable and because they are useful in exchange and gold is valuable because it is useful for other things like making stuff look cool and because it can back notes which are useful in exchange.  That part is pretty straightforward.

Where it goes off the rails is when notes are suddenly not backed by anything, or at least not by anything obvious.  Then we are left trying to say with a straight face that they are valuable only because they can be used for exchange.  The reality, as I have been saying, is that this is not the sole reason.  They still have value for two reasons.  One is that they are nice and liquid and the other is that they are the contractually required payment of debt and defaulting on debt has real consequences.  It’s not that they are not backed by anything, it’s just that the assets backing them are not uniform.  They are our houses, cars, businesses, etc.

Once you realize this, you can start to see why money does not act as a veil over barter, just like gold doesn’t act as a veil over barter.  Gold is a real good and a medium of exchange, money acts as a medium of exchange and a contractual claim on specific real goods.  So in the Walrasian general equilibrium with no money and gold as a good, you can get an excess demand for gold and an excess supply of all other goods.  Similarly, you can get an excess demand for money and an excess supply of all other goods with “fiat” money.  But in order to really grasp what is going on, you have to look at money and credit as a form of trading between periods in a dynamic model.

When you do this, it is clear that the expected rate of inflation and the nominal interest rate make up an important part of the budget constraint.  Since money is “convertible” into peoples’ houses, cars, businesses, etc. at a fixed rate, their willingness to hold money and debt depends on how valuable they expect that money to be in the future.  If they suddenly decide that it might be harder to get money in the future to pay off their debts, they may try to hold less debt and/or more money.  At current pries this is an “excess demand” for money which really represents an “excess demand” for future goods (like keeping their houses) relative to current goods.  But this only happens because their budget constraints across present and future goods shifted inward unexpectedly.  If everyone keeps eating out twice a week, they will all be unable to pay off their mortgages at the new expected rates of interest and inflation so they try to get more money and fewer current goods.  if prices cannot fall, you get a general glut.

So if you want to work at it, I think you can put this into the context of Walras’ law (more or less) if you imagine a dynamic version of it.  But this is only possible once you recognize the true nature of money and abandon the “fiat explanation of value” (it makes sense because we say it makes sense), and the notion of a veil over barter that goes with it.  And in order to do that, it helps to sit around and ponder what Walras’ Law really means and how it relates to what is actually going on for an afternoon or six.  And in order for people to do that, we have to keep teaching the damn law!

It’s Demand for Money, Not Demand for Currency

August 12, 2014 5 comments

As regular readers know, I am a guy who sort of stumbled into monetary economics and as such, I have been going through a process of discovering the minutia of how everyone else thinks about money and trying to reconcile this with what I think I know. And it turns out that there are a lot of little issues that come up which make it hard for me to explain what I am thinking in the context of existing paradigms. These issues all basically revolve around the reason that money is valuable. I think this is because “money” represents the contractually obligated payment of debt. Most others seem to start from some kind of explanation that can basically be summed up as “it just is.”

The “it just is” explanation makes sense in the context of commodity money, since commodities have value independently of their use as money. However, I think this explanation is highly suspect when it comes to “fiat” money, which I would call “credit money.” Of course, historically, the line between the two is a bit blurred and this has largely, in my view, prevented the profession from drawing clear distinctions between them. Instead, we have basically just substituted base money in for the old commodity money and built our models around the assumption that this base money works essentially the same way except that we can make the quantity whatever we want.

This leads to a plethora of little assumptions that are difficult to flush out because, individually, they seem like they don’t matter. But they seem this way because they fit into a larger paradigm which is built on this (I think erroneous) belief about the reason money is valuable.

One such issue is the way we think about the demand for money. The simple version of the conventional wisdom goes something like this: There is a quantity of money in circulation. An individual can get rid of this only by spending it. The price of holding this money is the nominal interest rate. If people have more money than they desire to hold, they try to spend it. When everyone is trying to hold less money, either prices have to go up or interest rates have to fall until they are all holding the desired amount.

The problem with this is that people have another option (or options depending on how you look at it) which is to lend it or deposit it. However, the conventional wisdom has a nice way of dealing with this by conflating the two.

In the basic Macro 101 money multiplier model, we say that there is some amount of base money which gets multiplied by the banking system in the following way: People deposit some amount of it into banks who then lend it. The people who borrow it then spend it. The people who receive this money then deposit some of it into a bank and the process repeats until people and banks are holding their desired (or required) quantities of this base money.

In this process, the willingness of people to hold currency (base money) is crucial. The less currency they are willing to hold, the more they deposit at each iteration and the higher the money multiplier. This means that there is more spending which means higher “aggregate demand” and higher prices (and potentially higher output). This willingness to hold currency, naturally, depends on the rate of interest since this is the price paid for holding it rather than depositing it. People are assumed to pay this price because currency is more liquid. In the 101 treatment, it is typically (though implicitly) assumed that all spending is done with currency.

In this context, the banks are essentially reduced to an intermediary between borrowers and lenders. So when you deposit money, you are really lending it to someone else in order that they may spend it. So even though an individual may avoid either holding or spending the money, someone else has to end up holding or spending it and in aggregate all “money” (currency) gets either held or spent.

In this context, the interest rate can be thought to be determined endogenously as the rate at which the quantity of loans demanded is equal to the quantity supplied in the form of deposits, given the quantity of base money in circulation. Alternatively, we can think of the central bank setting (targeting) a given interest rate and providing the quantity of base money which is demanded at that rate (required to hit the target). In this context the distinction is seemingly unimportant.

In this model, anything which increases the money supply or decreases the demand for base money (including reducing the reserve ratio) increases “aggregate demand” and either prices or output or both.

However, this is not what I think the primary function of banks is. The primary function of banks is to create liquidity. This, I believe is true even in an entirely decentralized, free banking sector with a commodity standard. I have argued this before, so I won’t go through the whole spiel again here but I want to point out how this changes the way we look at money.

First of all, let us notice that it is the creation of a particular form of liquid asset (demand deposits) which separates banks from all other financial intermediaries. For instance, a bond fund acts as an intermediary between borrowers and lenders. However, a bond fund cannot create additional “money” the way a bank can. If you invest with a bond fund, you must take dollars (or whatever) out of your bank account, give them to the fund who can then give them to the borrower (buy bonds). The quantity of dollars in the system doesn’t change.

A bank, on the other hand, can take my deposit in a checking account, let’s say $100, and then lend it. When they do this, I still have $100 which I can spend at any time and somebody else now also has $100 that they can spend at any time. [Please note, that this is not an anti-fractional-reserve rant, I’m not saying this is bad, just that it is important. I’m working up to something much more subtle.] The reason you get a higher rate of return (normally) in a bond fund than in a checking account is that the checking account is more liquid.  In particular, it is worth noting that, like currency, a balance in your checking account is nominally denominated and represents a contractually (legally) acceptable form of payment of debts unlike shares in a bond fund or accounts receivable from a loan you made to your friend.  The latter must first be sold at some market rate to obtain some form of money (either cash or deposits) before a debt can be paid.

So whereas a bond fund makes a profit (which is to say “exists”) because it has (or is perceived to have) an advantage in determining profitable investments, the bank makes a profit because it is able to “borrow” at a lower rate (compared to a bond fund or other financial intermediary) because of its ability to offer a more liquid product in return which in turn is due to its ability to multiply a dollar into two dollars (and collectively into much more).

Now the subtle thing that I am working up to here is that it is not the willingness to hold currency that matters, it is the willingness to hold dollars in all forms (or insert unit of your choice). And this is where the “endogenous” vs. “exogenous” money debate starts to matter.

So the first thing to notice is that cash is not necessarily more liquid than demand deposits, they are differently liquid. There are some transactions for which cash is more convenient and there are some for which demand deposits are more convenient. In today’s world, it is probably the case that the latter make up the majority of transactions and even if they don’t, it is certainly not the case that cash is at all times preferred to deposit accounts and we only deposit money because it pays a higher interest rate. On the contrary, even if all transactions were slightly more convenient with cash, we would still hold most of our “money” in deposit accounts and withdraw it from time to time to make purchases because holding all of that cash would be inconvenient. So we can’t say that it is the interest rate which induces us to hold deposits instead of currency. It is actually liquidity preference. And indeed, until 2011, it was illegal to pay interest on demand deposits in the U.S. (and after that interest rates have essentially been zero anyway).

Now the thing we care about is neither the demand for currency nor the demand for money in a broader sense. What we are really interested in is aggregate demand. The question is which one of these, if either, helps us understand the behavior of aggregate demand.   Thinking about the demand for base money works fine for this purpose under two assumptions. The first is that the thing which is exogenous is the supply of base money. Second is that the process of multiplication, as outlined above, adheres to a stable process in all regards other than the demand for base money.

The first assumption is sort of wrong in the sense that it is not the way that monetary authorities say they conduct policy but taken alone, there is room to argue that this is not an important distinction which I and others have done. I think this does matter but only after we address the second assumption.

The second assumption holds much of the time but not always. It just so happens that it is when it breaks down that we run into problems. Specifically, it is the assumption that money which is deposited automatically gets loaned and money that is loaned automatically gets spent (therefore adding to aggregate demand) that is problematic. Assuming this allows us to draw a straight line from depositing currency to spending and keeps our “either spend it or hold it” paradigm intact.

However, if we look at this a different way, with “endogenous” money, things change. Instead of imagining that the central bank just dumps in a certain quantity of money and the system goes from there, imagine that they operate as “lender of last resort” to the banks and stand ready to supply whatever quantity of base money is demanded at a given rate. So the supply curve faced by banks will be perfectly elastic (horizontal) at that rate. Then the supply of loans will be perfectly elastic at some rate which accounts for the cost of running a bank and the risk of a given loan. This will then be independent of the willingness to hold currency.

Now if the rate on deposits is allowed to float freely, that rate will rise to the rate at which the central bank stands ready to lend reserves (the discount rate or federal funds rate). But if it is prohibited by law from being greater than zero, then it will be zero. This rate on deposits will affect the composition of people’s money holdings between currency and deposits but in neither case will that decision between currency and deposits ration the amount of loans made. If the quantity of deposits is less than the amount required to make the loans which are demanded at the discount rate, then the difference will be made up by borrowing from the central bank.

[Note that I consider normal open market operations, and not just lending at the discount window, equivalent to lending reserves to banks. This point is subtle but is a potential bone of contention and raises some other questions like how best to treat government borrowing in this context but I will leave this for later.]

In this context, we can see that it is the demand for loans which is important not the willingness to hold currency. If people are willing to borrow more at the rate set by the central bank, the money supply will expand and if they are not willing to borrow more, it will not, regardless of people’s preferences between holding cash and holding deposits. If people suddenly decide to hold more cash, the banks will simply borrow more from the central bank in order to make the demanded quantity of loans.

Now the central bank can still pump more money into the system by buying other assets and there will still be a type of hot-potato effect. But this is not driven by their willingness to hold currency, it is driven by their willingness to hold money and their willingness to hold debt. When they get the new money, they can either hold it (as either cash or deposits, it doesn’t matter which) or spend it on goods or they can reduce their debt. Either holding money (any kind of money) or paying down debt, increases their money to debt ratio. That is what matters. It doesn’t matter whether they hold it in the form of currency or deposits because depositing it doesn’t actually lead to more lending and then more spending.

At this point I started explaining how I think “unconventional” monetary injections work but it quickly became clear that that requires an entire post of its own so I will leave it for later. For now let me just stick to the point which I originally set out to make which is that it isn’t the willingness to hold currency relative to deposits that matters, it is the willingness to hold money (all money) relative to debt.

This point can be approached from another direction, if one is intent on taking the money supply as exogenous. It is clear that the thing the central bank wants to target is not the money supply but rather something like aggregate demand (some combination of prices and output or unemployment or something). It is obvious, I think, that if people suddenly decide to hold more currency and fewer deposits, the central bank will accommodate them by increasing the quantity of base money accordingly. In my way of looking at it this happens automatically as banks borrow more at the set interest rate but you may think of it as the central bank increasing the base through lending (which may include buying treasury securities) such that the interest rate stays the same. This would cause no change in aggregate demand.

In this case, it would be easy to do this because the increased demand for currency would increase the demand for base money. So it is hard to see how this would cause a problem if the central bank were not sticking to an arbitrary and counter-productive money-base target. Or, put another way, no demand for currency vs. deposits should cause the normal transmission mechanism to seize up. The important link in the money-multiplier chain is the willingness to borrow—the part which is typically taken for granted.

On the other hand, If people suddenly want to hold less debt and more money (any kind of money), then the central bank may not be able to pump more money in through that mechanism and increase aggregate demand, even at a zero rate. People may then start to wonder how easy it will be to get the dollars in the future to pay off their debts if the central bank’s injection mechanism is failing and they will try to get more money and less debt (and buy fewer goods) and it will spiral. The central bank will then have to find another way to inject money.

Similarly, in a state where there are large quantities of excess reserves in the banks and interest rates are near zero, if inflation expectations increased, it wouldn’t be the sudden unwillingness of people to hold currency and rush to deposit it into the banks that would lift aggregate demand, it would be the sudden willingness to borrow that would draw down reserves, increase the broad measure of money in circulation and lift aggregate demand.  It is this willingness to hold money (any kind of money) vs. willingness to hold debt that matters, not currency vs. deposits. However, this can only be seen once you notice that these two things (money and debt) are intimately related and free your mind from the shackles of the “it just is” theory of money value.

Taking the People Out of Economics

August 6, 2014 15 comments

Jason Smith has a post in which he questions whether we really need to bother considering human thought to do economics.

I’m questioning the idea that observed macroeconomic relationships (price level and money supply, RGDP and employment) are the result of humans making decisions with money. This blog posits that macroeconomics is just about the large quantity of things (money, people in the labor force, goods and services) and human thought has a peripheral role. In that list we don’t care what goods or money think, so why are humans so special?

This started out as a comment on the post but it got so big that it needed a bit more room to spread its wings.

First, allow me to fulfill my role as internet utility policeman by pointing out that nothing depends on diminishing marginal utility! (Sorry to shout, it’s just that this hit a nerve.)

There are no economic laws that are independent of human thought. Even supply curves depend on expectations of future prices and demand curves depend on consumers’ tastes and preferences (and diminishing marginal utility).

Now, here is a little excerpt from the intro to my intro text.

Economics uses a set of principles, or propositions, to analyze human behavior.  Analyzing human behavior is what makes economics part of social science.  Social science is the study of human behavior.

So I think the reason that economists are so interested in human behavior is that they are economists and economics is the study of human behavior.  Trying to take the human out of it probably has a certain appeal to someone from outside the much maligned, “social sciences” but it is kind of like saying “I want to do physics, just without all the matter and energy.  I think those concepts just get in the way.”

Regarding the Le Pesant example, I’m not familiar with that specific case but it seems to me he was totally right about that and would not have been able to anticipate such a problem if he had not been able to infer certain things about human behavior.

Also, as far as other species go, yes I absolutely do think that many economic concepts work with many other species on earth.  If we encountered a species which “though differently” it would only mean that their preferences were unusual (compared to us).  In fact it COULD only mean that because preferences (which is what utility represents) are basically just defined as a way of identifying what someone or something would choose if faced with a given set of alternatives.  Any thing which acts deliberately can be said to have some set of preferences and given those preferences, you can apply some version of economics to determine what would happen if you put them, and potentially some other acting entities together under a certain set of circumstances.  If the preferences are unusual in some way, the results may be different but this does not mean that economics per se is somehow unique to human thought and behavior.

There are very few economic laws that are entirely independent of the characteristics of preferences but that is exactly why human thought can’t be ignored.  If the preferences didn’t matter, then you would have a nice law that would work out for any imaginable species of thinking being and the thought would be irrelevant.  But since the thinking (and therefore the preferences) are relevant, you can’t say things like “someone’s demand curve has to be downward sloping under any conceivable set of circumstances.”  You can only observe that what we observe seems to be almost always consistent with downward sloping demand curves.  And for the record, I suspect that if we find thinking, acting, life on other planets, their preferences will have the same basic properties that are usually assumed for humans.  But just imagining that they might not be doesn’t invalidate the business of looking at how the beings we actually know about make decisions.

With that in mind, I think the answer to Jason’s initial question (in response to Noah Smith)  is a simple “yes, we do know that.”  That doesn’t mean that you can’t organize information in a way that ignores that fact and still has some predictive power, but the fact remains and it is likely that you will be better able to understand the situation if you don’t choose to ignore it.

This is the important distinction between humans and goods or money.  We don’t care what goods or money think because they don’t think.  They don’t act in any kind of purposeful way.  Humans do.  Physics tries to explain the “behavior” of inanimate objects by identifying laws that govern that behavior.  This gives you a certain set of physical laws which (at least potentially) entirely describe how an inanimate object will behave in any given situation (or at least they would if we knew all of the physical laws perfectly, and maybe in some cases you need an infinite number of dimensions because the location of some particle is not deterministic or whatever but if you drop a stone off of a cliff, the laws of physics tell you exactly what it will do).

People, (and dogs and cats and mosquitos and pistol shrimp and what have you) are restrained by these laws or course.  If you drop a person off of a cliff, gravity tells you pretty-much what they will do.  But they do not fully describe our behavior.  That person might flail around in any number of ways or try to streamline their body and glide slightly to the left and aim for a haystack.  Whatever, the person does, there is some process going on that determines it.  When your alarm clock goes off in the morning there are all manner of possible things which you could do between then and bedtime which would be consistent with the laws of physics but somehow, for some reason, one particular set of things happens. The goal of social science, including economics, is to create some framework of “laws” (though in economics these tend to not be very concrete) which explain the choices that people make and analyze the consequences when multiple people making choices interact with each other.

If you had no idea what an atom or a molecule was, you could still notice that when you heated water it boiled and evaporated.  But that “macro” event is, in fact, the result of something that is going on at the molecular level.  You don’t need to know what is going on at the molecular level to make tea but if you want to build a nuclear power plant, you probably do.  At any rate, once you notice that water is made up of molecules, it probably makes scientific sense to try to look at them and figure out how the “behavior” of each one affects the “behavior” of the conglomeration.

Categories: Uncategorized

Is it Dedication to High or Low Inflation Which Leads to Communism?

July 31, 2014 4 comments

Nick Rowe has a post about the line between fiscal and monetary policy which largely reflects my sense of the matter which essentially is that the line is not very clear.  However, this part was the opposite of how I see it (sort of).

Too dedicated a pursuit of low inflation and the optimum quantity of money leads to communism, with government ownership of everything.

Also Scott Sumner echoed the same sentiment.  Since both of those guys are “at least as smart” as I am and have been at this a bit longer, this has got my wheels turning trying to reconcile their conclusion with my own and I think it raises several important points about the way I am thinking about this thing relative to them (and probably nearly everyone else).

First, I apparently don’t know what Sumner (and probably nearly everyone else) actually means when they say “fiscal policy” since I recently said something to the effect of: clearly a helicopter drop is monetary policy, but then in the comments, Sumner says this.

I’m strongly opposed to helicopter drops. I favor monetary stimulus when NGDP is too low. There is never any need for fiscal stimulus, even at the zero bound, and a helicopter drop is fiscal stimulus. It is wasteful and inefficient.

So I’m not sure where Scott’s line is.  To me, if the central bank printed money and dropped it from a helicopter, it would increase the supply of base money and this would be monetary policy.  Perhaps Scott is thinking that the government “borrows” from the central bank and then drops the money (or whatever they do with it), and so this increases the deficit and this makes it fiscal policy which may or may not then be offset by some monetary policy.  If that is the case, it is just a matter of who we are imagining doing the “dropping.”  To me this is splitting hairs, and not that important (which is basically the point of Nick’s post).   This post also deals with helicopter drops.

On a side note, I am not sure why Sumner objects on the grounds of inefficiency.  It can’t be a matter of changing the income distribution since he is such a bloody utilitarian after all.  This got me very puzzled so I went on his blog and looked for posts about helicopter drops and found this one which raises two possibilities for inefficiency.  One is based on the expectation that the government will someday raise taxes to pay off the money it dropped.  This also explains why it counts a fiscal policy.  The other is that it may cause peoples’ expectations about inflation to become unhinged and cause hyperinflation.

But that’s not really what I am interested in.  I’m not arguing for helicopter drops.  I’m trying to get at why we are at the ZLB in the first place and how monetary policy relates to the central bank ultimately owning stuff.  And I think this helps bring things into focus.

But if the Fed did accompany the drop with an explicit price level target, then the optimal helicopter drop would be less than zero.  Indeed if the Fed committed to say 4% inflation, the public would not want to hold even the current $2 trillion in base money (unless they were paid to do so with an interest on reserve program.)

That makes perfect sense.  If you hold the money supply constant, and increase expected inflation, people will want to hold fewer dollars at the current price level and so they will try to get rid of them by spending them which will drive up the price level.   Or at least this is how you would see it if you take the money supply as exogenous.

If you take nominal rates as exogenous, then an increase in inflation expectations, holding the nominal rate constant, will lower the real interest rate which will cause people to borrow more in order to buy stuff (both investment and consumption).  This drives up the price level and increases the money supply.  However, the interest rate regime can mimic the outcome in the money supply regime by raising the nominal rate to the point that the money supply doesn’t change.  Similarly, the money supply regime could expand the money supply until the nominal rate remained unchanged (or either of them could do something in between….or not in between for that matter).  That is not the important difference.

Either way you want to think about it, you have a tradeoff between the size of the money supply that is required to maintain a given price level and the expected rate of inflation.   If you are trying to hit a certain price level in the very short run, you can get there with a smaller money supply if people expect higher inflation in the longer run.  This seems to be the tradeoff between tight money and socialism that Nick and Scott have in mind and it is perfectly valid at any given point in time.  This instantaneous effect can be seen in my model as well (I’m pretty sure, although I can’t verify it right now due to technical difficulties…)

So essentially I have no argument with the way monetary policy functions in the short run.  My issue is about whether there is a stable long-run equilibrium.  This is where the relationship between money and debt becomes important.  If you think that money just floats around and has value solely because everyone believes that everyone else will always be willing to trade for it, then you imagine a demand for real money balances which depends only on the interest rate and output.  So if you can raise inflation, you can raise interest rates along with it and this will put you on a path where the desired money holdings will be smaller relative to the nominal value of output at all times.  Or in other words, the money supply will be higher but prices will be more higher and so the size of the central bank’s balance sheet in real terms will be smaller.

The point I am trying to make is that there is a sort of financial position that the economy gets into vis-a-vis the central bank when the central bank expands the money supply by expanding credit.  When they do this, they are essentially increasing the money supply by convincing people to lever up.  This can be done by either offering a lower nominal rate or convincing them that prices will be higher in the future.  Either one lowers the real rate of interest and makes it more attractive to go deeper into debt.  But this is not just more money floating around, it is more money and more debt which means that the public’s claim on the total money supply actually diminishes.

As an individual borrower, this works out fine as long as the central bank produces the anticipated inflation (0r more).  Then your income increases enough to repay the loans as expected and everybody wins.  But if everybody tried to repay their debts, the money supply would shrink which would mean that prices wouldn’t go up as anticipated.  So the central bank has to keep this from happening.  This means that they get into a pattern of perpetually lowering interest rates to further increase the money supply by increasing leverage and eroding the financial position of the overall economy.

Then one day they fail to produce the expected inflation, maybe because they hit the ZLB or maybe because they made a mistake, or maybe because people saw the ZLB coming and acted preemptively, or whatever and everything falls apart.  The reason it falls apart is because of the financial position of the economy.  It isn’t just that everyone suddenly thinks prices will only rise 1% instead of 2% so they start “hoarding” cash balances because the extra liquidity becames attractive at the lower inflation rate and this creates a death spiral (which is only “deathy” because prices can’t adjust fast enough to keep people from being laid off and output from falling).

It is that they think prices will only rise 1% instead of 2% and they took on a bunch of debt in anticipation of their income rising 2% which they now become concerned that they won’t be able to repay.  They start “hoarding cash” to repay the debts.  If they don’t, they will go bankrupt and lose real goods.  Since everyone else is in the same situation, everyone tries to grab the existing cash and pay off debts which causes the money supply to contract and prices to fall further until some combination of things restores the financial position of the economy to a point from which it can continue onward.

These things include:

1. Defaults.  This destroys debt without “destroying” money, which increases the ratio of money to debt.

2.  “Fiscal policy.”  This keeps the debt growing but it puts it on the government, so it can be done coercively (it doesn’t have to be individually rational).  This puts more money in circulation without increasing private debt.

3.  “Unconventional” monetary policy.  For instance a “monetary helicopter drop” by which I mean the central bank dropping money into the economy (a “fiscal helicopter drop” would then be when the government borrows money and drops it, in which case see number 2 above).  Or the central bank buying junk off of banks’ books for more than it is worth (this has some element of number 1 involved) or “adding zeroes” to their accounts, or buying up goods and services (rather than debt).  All of this will inject more money into the economy without increasing debt.  (We can throw dividends paid by the central bank into this category.)

So my point is that you can’t have what I would call a “long-run expansionary monetary policy” based purely on expanding credit.  You will need some combination of the above three things to keep the financial position of the economy on a sustainable path or to bring it back to such a path if it drifts away (as it is bound to do if you try to avoid those things for any extended period).

So in my model, it is not just about the willingness to hold cash balances, it is about the willingness to hold cash (or I would say “money” to include all balances denominated in dollars, or whatever) balances and the willingness to hold debt.  So to me the tradeoff between expansionary monetary policy and “socialism” is not just about how big the central bank’s balance sheet will have to be relative to the nominal value of output in a stable long-run equilibrium.  It is about how much of number 2 and 3 you would need relative to the value of output in a stable long-run equilibrium.  And I suspect that the more “expansionary” (the higher the intended rate of inflation), the more of this you will need in order to keep it from crashing.

Unfortunately, because of the previously mentioned technical difficulties, I  can’t show this in the context of the model at the moment.  But notice that there would be no such “socialism” necessary if there were no central bank in the first place and the money supply consisted of an exogenously determined quantity of some commodity like gold or silver.  In that case, there would almost certainly be some amount of deflation as the quantity of that commodity would most likely grow more slowly than output. (Or a better way of putting it: the rate of return on holding that commodity would have to be equal to the real rate of interest minus the liquidity premium and this would most likely be positive.  The selection of commodities which increase in quantity relatively slowly compared to output as money would happen endogenously.)

In this case, the private (excluding the central bank but not necessarily the government) claim on the money supply would always remain at 100%.  It is the adoption of a central bank which promises to create inflation by growing the money supply (by increasing credit/debt) which creates the gap between the money supply and the monetary wealth in the economy which has to be filled by some kind of non-credit injection of money or else closed by a wave of defaults.

Similarly, if the central bank just kept the rate of inflation (deflation) and the nominal interest rate equal to what they would be if it didn’t exist, it would do nothing, credit would not expand, the financial situation of the economy would not be eroded in any way and no “socialism” would be necessary.  It becomes necessary when they endeavor to expand the money supply by expanding credit.  The more inflation they want to create, the more they will have to do this and the more they will erode the financial condition of the economy in the absence of the three things mentioned above.  Or in other words, the more they will have to do those things to keep it going.  Or in still other words,  too dedicated a pursuit of high inflation and the optimal quantity of money leads to communism with the government owning everything.

“Fiscal Policy”

July 18, 2014 2 comments

Scott Sumner says this in response to a question from Tom about my model.

Tom, I don’t view fiscal policy as a partisan issue. The GOP loves tax cuts, for instance. Bush did a tax cut in 2008 for AD reasons.

What’s the intuition behind his result? Does he assume monetary policy is ineffective at boosting AD at the zero bound? Obviously it’s not ineffective, but I’m just trying to figure out where that result comes from.

First, I agree that “monetary policy” is effective at the zero bound.  What I am actually trying to say is that monetary policy is required which cannot be carried out by what I assumed was the normal method of setting an interest rate and then creating whatever quantity of liquidity was required.  So my main mistake was using the word “fiscal policy.”  I shouldn’t have done that.  I think of this as an explanation for why what most people call fiscal policy works, but it is a nominal explanation.  So in that respect, I am really talking about monetary policy, just a different kind of monetary policy which may or may not be carried out in the form of government spending.

To see what I have in mind, think of the central government, the central bank, and the banking sector as one entity.  The policy considered in the model was simply setting an interest rate and lending whatever funds are desired at that rate.  But because those funds have to be paid back, and the interest rate is positive, the value of net monetary wealth (money minus debt) is decreasing over time.  But in the face of that, the central authority is trying to create inflation.  This means that they have to keep the money supply increasing.  This means that they have to get people to borrow more and more relative to the value of their monetary wealth which means that they have to keep lowering the nominal (and real) interest rate.

So basically what I’m saying is that this creates a disconnect between expectations about future price levels and the price levels that can be sustained indefinitely through only lending by the CB.  As long as there is slack in the interest rate, they can keep this going, but the longer it goes, the gap between the expected price level next period and what the price level would fall to if the money supply suddenly stopped growing on schedule.

Now the reason the money supply stops growing on schedule could be many things.  It could be that they hit the lower bound and can’t induce enough lending.  It could be that they mistakenly set rates too high.  It could be that for some unexplained reason people decide to stop borrowing (which, of course must also be accompanied by one of the previous two explanations).  But whatever the reason, if the money supply comes up a bit short, all hell could break loose.

This is for many reasons, some of which I have touched on in discussions about the significance of money being backed by debt.  I will talk more about them in the future.  But for now all I want to say is that they can be avoided if the money supply can be kept on track.  The important thing is that once you are at the zero bound this can’t be done by simply inducing more borrowing in the usual way.  You have to do something else to get the money out there.  This could be government spending, funded by fresh money.  For the record, I think that Sumner would say that this has a nominal and a fiscal component and it is the nominal component that I am interested in.  But it could also be buying garbage debt for more than it is worth, or buying pretty much anything for that matter or, for that matter, buying absolutely nothing and just dumping money from helicopters.

This, of course, is the sort of the purest possible conception of “monetary policy.”  But I will call it “unconventional monetary policy” (which, for the record, was also included in the heading of the section next to the words “fiscal policy” if I recall correctly).  This allows me to draw the distinction which I think is important between “conventional monetary policy” which is carried out by expanding credit through borrowing and lending and “unconventional monetary policy” which is carried out by expanding the money supply in some other way which is not connected to any debt (or at least not a private debt).

For the record, there are other types of monetary policy which get a lot of discussion around the zero bound which are considered unconventional but which I see as further attempts to expand credit through borrowing.  For instance, I see QE as an attempt to expand credit by pushing down longer-term interest rates.  The MBS part of QE can be seen as either trying to push down risk premiums and expand credit or a kind of “unconventional” injection to banks in the form of a payment above what those debts are actually worth.  Lowering the interest rate on reserves is essentially equivalent to lowering interest rates in my mind, it just means that you aren’t really at the ZLB.

Now I don’t think that I am saying anything very controversial about how monetary policy works at the ZLB.  The thing I am saying which I think is controversial is that there is a natural tendency toward the ZLB in this system of inflation via credit expansion.

For the record, if the CB pays out all profits from interest payments in the form of a dividend, that also adds a source of additional slack.  I think this will mitigate the issue but not fully fix it but I have to do some more work to be sure about that.

Categories: Uncategorized

Some Graphs

In my last post, I put forth a model which leads to the crackpot conclusion that central banks, doing what they do, necessarily lead us into a “liquidity” trap unless there is some significant, and ever-increasing, leakage of money which is not backed by debt back into the economy (in other words “fiscal policy”).  I didn’t say very much about fiscal policy, there is a lot of work left to do which I intend to be doing for a while.  But at this point, just in case you are thinking that this theory is nutty, here are some graphs.

Quick history for the uninitiated.  The U.S. went off the (international) gold standard in 1971.  Then there was a decade of “stagflation” where inflation was high and, to put it (overly) simply, the Fed’s policy goals were not all that clear and people were still trying to figure out what was going on and what it meant in the long-run.  Then Paul Volcker was appointed chair of the Fed and vowed to rein in inflation which he did.  Since then, it has been supposed by many that the Fed has essentially been following a de facto inflation target.  The following graphs go from August 1979 (when Volcker was appointed) until the present.  We all know basically what output and the price level have done, so let’s cut to the chase.

Fed Funds Rate

fed funds rate

Ten-Year Yield

ten year yield

Now total debt is a little tricky.  Here is loans and leases in bank credit; all commercial banks, and the M2 money stock.

Loans and leases in bank credit, all commercial banks

 

m2

Notice that the ratio of M2 to total bank credit is about 1.74 in Nov. 1980 (this is as far back as the M2 series goes) and about 1.10 in Nov 2007.  Obviously, we know what happened next, and bank credit fell bringing the ratio back down to about 1.47 currently.  But of course, we also know what else happened….

“Fiscal Policy”

Federal debt held by fed banks

A Model of Endogenous Money

July 16, 2014 26 comments

I’ve been working on a macro model in which the quantity of money is endogenous and I want to post an early version of it here before I do any more complaining about other people not doing anything constructive.   I am attaching it as a pdf because I couldn’t get the equations to work in wordpress.  It is sort of a cross between a blog post and a working paper, lots of equations and boring math but with some very informal discussion here and there.  Also, to put all the math in would have been very tedious, so I tried to put in as little as possible, so some steps are omitted.  It should be possible to reconstruct what I did here from what I included but it would take some effort (and probably a mathematical computing package).  I think it is possible to organize it in a simpler way but I am still working on that.

The thing you should take away from this is that monetary policy, as we are currently doing it (inflation targeting) works much the way we think it works but that I think it either leads, in a predictable way, into a “liquidity trap” and a deflationary recession in the long run or it requires ever-expanding “fiscal policy” to keep this from happening.

A Model of Endogenous Money

 

 

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